Definitions

  • CR10-015.  “Abuse prevention order” (11/28/01)
  • CR10-025.  “Actual physical control” of motor vehicle (06/18/03)
  • CR10-035.  “Assault.”  For use when a short instruction is appropriate. (01/08/02)
  • CR10-045.  “Associate” in context of charge for violation of conditions of release (06/18/03)
  • CR10-061.  “Bodily injury” (07/29/05)
  • CR10-075.  “Circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life” (11/09/07)
  • CR10-091.  “Coerce” (11/09/07)
  • CR10-101.  “Compel” (10/18/13)
  • CR10-116.  “Consent” in the context of a sexual assault (09/25/23)
  • CR10-125.  “Constructive possession” (01/26/04)
  • CR10-135.  “Contact” in the context of a sexual act (09/05/02)
  • CR10-145.  “Contacting” in the context of a violation of an order (07/15/03)
  • CR10-155.  “Course of conduct” in the context of stalking (11/09/07)
  • CR10-165.  “Custodian” (11/29/01)
  • CR10-174.  “Danger” (11/291/01)
  • CR10-175.  “Danger” in the context of reckless endangerment (06/18/03)
  • CR10-181.  “Dangerous weapon” in the context of assault and robbery (11/29/01)
  • CR10-191.  “Dating” (11/29/01)
  • CR10-201.  “Deadly force” (06/18/03)
  • CR10-211.  “Deadly weapon” (06/18/03).  See 13 V.S.A. § 1021(a)(3); State v. Kuzawski, 2017 VT 118, ¶¶8–18; State v. Longley, 2007 VT 101, 182 Vt. 452.
  • CR10-221.  “Deception” (12/03/01)
  • CR10-241.  “Deliberation” (07/15/03)
  • CR10-261.  “Emergency” (11/29/01)
  • CR10-281.  “Facilitate” (11/29/01)
  • CR10-301.  “False alarm” (05/13/02)
  • CR10-311.  “Family member.”  Although the definition of “family member” sounds simple, there are a number of unresolved issues, having to do with past marriages, distant relatives, etc.  See Embree v. Balfanz, 174 Vt. 560 (2002).  (07/29/05)
  • CR10-321.  “Firearm.”  The committee’s understanding is that the word “firearm” should be construed broadly to include guns, pistols, revolvers, rifles, etc.  The definition in CR10-321 derives from 13 V.S.A. § 3019.  Although the statute limits the use to the particular section of the criminal code, there is no indication that the word “firearm” should be construed more narrowly in other contexts.  (07/17/02)
  • CR10-331.  “Flight” (11/29/01)
  • CR10-351.  “Following” in the context of stalking (03/25/02)
  • CR10-356.  “Following” in the context of a violation of an order (01/10/05)
  • CR10-381.  “Force” (11/29/01)
  • CR10-401.  “Great bodily harm” (05/13/02)
  • CR10-418.  “Harassing” in the context of violation of conditions of release.  The definition derives from various dictionary definitions.  Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed.) provides the following discussion:  “. . .  Term is used in variety of legal contexts to describe words, gestures and actions which tend to annoy, alarm and abuse (verbally) another person. . . .  A person commits a petty misdemeanor if, with purpose to harass another, he (1) makes a telephone call without purpose of legitimate communication; or (2) insults, taunts or challenges another in a manner likely to provoke violent or disorderly response; or (3) makes repeated communications anonymously or at extremely inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language; or (4) subjects another to an offensive touching; or (5) engages in any other course of alarming conduct serving no legitimate purpose of the actor.  Model Penal Code, § 250.4.”  Note that there are alternative definitions of “harassment” in CR10-421, CR22-301, and CR27-611. (07/16/03)
  • CR10-421.  “Harassing” in the context of stalking.  Note that there are alternative definitions of “harassment” in CR10-418, CR22-301, and CR27-611. (02/03/06)
  • CR10-441.  “Harbor” (12/03/01)
  • CR10-461.  “Hostage” (11/29/01)
  • CR10-471.  “Household member” (06/19/03)
  • CR10-481.  “Imminent” (11/29/01)
  • CR10-491.  “Inconvenience or annoyance” (11/29/01)
  • CR10-501.  “Intoxicating liquor” (09/05/02)
  • CR10-511.  “Involuntary servitude” (11/29/01)
  • CR10-521.  “Kidnapping” for use when a short instruction is appropriate (01/08/02)
  • CR10-531.  “Law enforcement officer” (04/21/03)
  • CR10-535.  “Lawful arrest” (01/10/02)
  • CR10-541.  “Lascivious” (11/29/01)
  • CR10-551.  “Lewdness” (11/29/01)
  • CR10-561.  “Lewd and lascivious” (06/19/03)
  • CR10-571.  “Lying in wait” (11/29/01)
  • CR10-581.  “Mutual consent” (06/19/03)
  • CR10-591.  “Nonconsensual” (11/29/01)
  • CR10-601.  “Open and gross” in the context of lewd and lascivious behavior (06/19/03)
  • CR10-611.  “Operate” a motor vehicle (05/13/02)
  • CR10-621.  “Organization” (11/29/01)
  • CR10-631.  “Physical menace” (11/29/01)
  • CR10-651.  “Premeditation” (06/19/03)
  • CR10-661.  “Presence of a person” (07/15/03)
  • CR10-671.  “Provocation” (09/22/03)
  • CR10-691.  “Public” (11/29/01)
  • CR10-696.  “Public alarm” (05/13/02)
  • CR10-701.  “Public highway” (05/13/02)
  • CR10-711.  “Ransom” (11/29/01)
  • CR10-721.  “Relatives” (07/29/05)
  • CR10-731.  “Reward” (09/05/02)
  • CR10-741.  “Restrain” (11/29/01)
  • CR10-751.  “Serious bodily injury” in the assault context. The revised definition of “serious bodily injury,” derived from 13 V.S.A. § 1021(2), reflects the legislative determination that strangulation constitutes serious bodily injury. Because the statute’s structure sets out Subsections 1021(2)(A) and (2)(B) as separate, alternative definitions, the updated instruction includes brackets to indicate that the entire definition may not be appropriate in all cases. For instance, where no evidence of strangulation is presented, there is no reason to instruct the jury on the definition of strangulation as provided in Subsection (2)(B). Conversely, in cases where the only evidence is of strangulation, there is no reason to instruct the jury on the definition in Subsection (2)(A) or, for that matter, the definition of “bodily injury.” The Committee recognizes that some cases might present evidence of both types of serious bodily injury (strangulation and non-strangulation). In those cases, it may be appropriate to instruct the jury on the entire statutory definition, and the jury would likely have to reach a unanimous decision as to either Subsection (2)(A) or (2)(B). Unlike the three “ascending mental states” for second degree murder, which are applied as a hierarchy, see State v. Boglioli, 2011 VT 60, ¶¶ 11–12, 190 Vt. 542; State v. Bolio, 159 Vt. 250, 253-54 (1992), the two definitions of serious bodily injury are presented as alternatives where one does not necessarily subsume the other. (06/15/15)
  • CR10-761.  “Sexual act” (11/29/01)
  • CR10-763.  “Sexual assault” in the context of kidnapping (09/23/02)
  • CR10-771.  “Shield” (11/29/01)
  • CR10-781.  “Subject of larceny” (11/29/01)
  • CR10-791.  “Substantial” (09/23/02)
  • CR10-801.  “Substantially impair” (12/03/01)
  • CR10-811.  “Sudden passion” (09/22/03)
  • CR10-821.  “Take” in the context of unlawful restraint (11/29/01)
  • CR10-831.  “Threat” in the context of unlawful restraint (11/29/01)
  • CR10-841.  “Threaten” (12/03/01)
  • CR10-851.  “Threatening behavior” in the context of disorderly conduct (07/15/03)
  • CR10-876.  “Tumultuous behavior” (11/29/01)
  • CR10-901.  “Violent behavior” (11/29/01)
  • CR10-941.  “Vulva” (11/29/01)
  • CR10-975.  “Wanton act” (01/10/06)
  • CR10-985.  “Without consent” in the context of kidnapping (11/29/01)
  • CR10-987.  “Without consent” in the context of consent of custodian (11/29/01)