{"id":719,"date":"2012-08-03T18:44:38","date_gmt":"2012-08-03T18:44:38","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/vtjuryinstructions.org\/?page_id=719"},"modified":"2025-04-22T18:15:11","modified_gmt":"2025-04-22T18:15:11","slug":"domestic-assault","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/vtjuryinstructions.org\/?page_id=719","title":{"rendered":"Domestic Assault"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><strong>Misdemeanor Domestic Assault<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>CR22-321.\u00a0 <a href=\"http:\/\/www.vtjuryinstructions.org\/criminal\/MS22-321.htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">Attempted to Cause Bodily Injury<\/a>, 13 V.S.A. \u00a7 1042 (03\/23\/07)<\/li>\n<li>CR22-331.\u00a0 <a href=\"http:\/\/www.vtjuryinstructions.org\/criminal\/MS22-331.htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">Caused Bodily Injury<\/a>, 13 V.S.A. \u00a7 1042 (09\/16\/05)<\/li>\n<li>CR22-336.\u00a0 <a href=\"http:\/\/www.vtjuryinstructions.org\/criminal\/MS22-336.htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">Caused Victim to Fear Imminent Serious Bodily Injury<\/a>, 13 V.S.A. \u00a7 1042 (06\/20\/12)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><strong>First Degree Aggravated Domestic Assault<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>CR22-346.\u00a0 <a href=\"http:\/\/www.vtjuryinstructions.org\/criminal\/MS22-346.htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">Attempted to Cause Serious Bodily Injury<\/a>, 13 V.S.A. \u00a7 1043(a)(1) (06\/15\/15)<\/li>\n<li>CR22-351.\u00a0 <a href=\"http:\/\/www.vtjuryinstructions.org\/criminal\/MS22-351.htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">Caused Serious Bodily Injury<\/a>, 13 V.S.A. \u00a7 1043(a)(1) (06\/15\/15)<\/li>\n<li>CR22-355.\u00a0 <a href=\"http:\/\/www.vtjuryinstructions.org\/criminal\/MS22-355.htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">Transition to Lesser-Included Charge of Attempted Domestic Assault <\/a>(09\/16\/11)<\/li>\n<li>CR22-356.\u00a0 <a href=\"http:\/\/www.vtjuryinstructions.org\/criminal\/MS22-356.htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">Transition to Lesser-Included Charge of Completed Domestic Assault <\/a>(03\/29\/04)<\/li>\n<li>CR22-361.\u00a0 <a href=\"http:\/\/www.vtjuryinstructions.org\/criminal\/MS22-361.htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">Used Deadly Weapon<\/a>, 13 V.S.A. \u00a7 1043(a)(2) (04\/08\/25)<\/li>\n<li>CR22-362.\u00a0 <a href=\"http:\/\/www.vtjuryinstructions.org\/criminal\/MS22-362.htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">Attempted to Use Deadly Weapon<\/a>, 13 V.S.A. \u00a7 1043(a)(2) (04\/08\/25)<\/li>\n<li>CR22-363.\u00a0\u00a0<a href=\"http:\/\/www.vtjuryinstructions.org\/criminal\/MS22-363.htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">Threatened to Use Deadly Weapon<\/a>, 13 V.S.A. \u00a7 1043(a)(2) (04\/08\/25)<\/li>\n<li>CR22-366.\u00a0 <a href=\"http:\/\/www.vtjuryinstructions.org\/criminal\/MS22-366.htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">Previous Conviction<\/a>, 13 V.S.A. \u00a7 1043(a)(3) (04\/22\/03)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><strong>Second Degree Aggravated Domestic Assault<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>CR22-371.\u00a0 <a href=\"http:\/\/www.vtjuryinstructions.org\/criminal\/MS22-371.htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">Violated Court Order<\/a>, 13 V.S.A. \u00a7 1044(a)(1) (10\/29\/10)<\/li>\n<li>CR22-372.\u00a0 <a href=\"http:\/\/www.vtjuryinstructions.org\/criminal\/MS22-372.htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">Alternative Phase II Enhancement for Violation of Court O<\/a>rder, 13 V.S.A. \u00a7 1044(a)(1) (10\/29\/10)<\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: left;\">CR22-376.\u00a0 <a href=\"http:\/\/www.vtjuryinstructions.org\/criminal\/MS22-376.htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">Subsequent Offense<\/a>, 13 V.S.A. \u00a7 1044(a)(2) (09\/16\/05)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p style=\"text-align: center;\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><strong>Reporter&#8217;s Notes<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\">The definition of \u201chousehold member,\u201d and an explanation of \u201cdating,\u201d derive from the statute at 15 V.S.A. \u00a7 1101(2).<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><strong>CR22-321, -331, -336. <em>Misdemeanor Domestic Assault and Lesser Included Offense of Simple Assault<\/em>.\u00a0<\/strong> Depending on the formulation of the charge, simple assault may be a lesser included offense of misdemeanor domestic assault. <em>See<\/em>, <em>e.g.<\/em>, <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">State v. Bean<\/span>, 2016 VT 73, \u00b6\u00b6 6\u201310, 202 Vt. 361. \u201cThe State may request a lesser-included instruction, even over the defendant\u2019s objections,\u201d and \u201cthis request must be granted if supported by the evidence.\u00a0<span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">Id<\/span>. \u00b6 14; <em>see also<\/em> 13 V.S.A. \u00a7 14(a).<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><strong>CR22-336.\u00a0<em> Fear of Imminent Serious Bodily Injury<\/em>.\u00a0 <\/strong>(Caution:\u00a0This statement has not been reviewed since the decision in <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">State v. Hinchliffe<\/span>,\u00a02009 VT 111, 186 Vt. 487.)\u00a0 It is not clear under Vermont law whether the court should instruct the jury with regard to the reasonableness of the victim\u2019s apprehension.\u00a0 As a penal statute, 13 V.S.A. \u00a7 1042 is to be accorded a strict construction, and the \u201crule of lenity\u201d applies.\u00a0 However, the statute appears to have been enacted to address the unique dynamic of domestic assault cases, where one party knows about traits of the other party which may be subject to exploitation in a manner that would not be operative in a case involving assaults among strangers.\u00a0 This dynamic is known as \u201cpushing buttons.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\">The case <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">State v. Riley<\/span>, 141 Vt. 29 (1982), discussed the matter of apprehension, indicating that Vermont adheres to the civil notion of assault by menace, but the decision does not address the question of whether the standard is one of reasonableness or a purely subjective test (\u201ca threat of immediate battery resulting in apprehension, even when intended only as a bluff, is so likely to result in a breach of the peace that it should be a punishable offense\u201d).\u00a0 One may argue that, in codifying the offense of domestic assault, the legislature did not intend the application of an objective standard.\u00a0 A subjective standard might be appropriate, given the unique circumstances of violence within the family and other close relationships, and the operative effects of such phenomena as patterned abuse and battered women\u2019s syndrome.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\">Under the common law of civil assault, apprehension of imminent battery is subject to an objective test of reasonableness:\u00a0 The apprehension must be one which would normally be aroused in the mind of a reasonable person.\u00a0 However, there is authority to the contrary, the theory being that \u201cif the defendant has knowledge of the plaintiff\u2019s peculiar and abnormal timidity, and intends to act upon it, there should be a right to recover.\u201d\u00a0 Prosser and Keeton, <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">Law of Torts<\/span>, \u00a7 10.\u00a0 Prosser also notes that the Restatement of Torts (Second) \u00a7 27 provides that reasonableness of the victim\u2019s apprehension is irrelevant, as long as the defendant acts with intent to place the other in apprehension of immediate bodily harm.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\">In at least one case, the trial court declined to instruct the jury as to either standard, over objection of both the State and Defendant, who had each requested instructions favorable to their respective theories.\u00a0 The court indicated that no instruction would be given as to the standard for assessment of apprehension unless, upon deliberation, the jury requested clarification.\u00a0 The court also pointed out that the jury would be instructed that each of the elements, including fear of imminent serious bodily injury, would have to be established beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the jurors were obliged to consider all pertinent evidence and surrounding circumstances in their assessment of proof of the element of placing another in fear of imminent harm as well as all other elements.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><strong>CR22-346, -351.<em> First Degree Aggravated Domestic Assault: Serious Bodily Injury.<\/em><\/strong> The revised definition of \u201cserious bodily injury,\u201d derived from 13 V.S.A. \u00a7 1021(2), reflects the legislative determination that strangulation constitutes serious bodily injury. Because the statute\u2019s structure sets out Subsections 1021(2)(A) and (2)(B) as separate, alternative definitions, the updated instruction includes brackets to indicate that the entire definition may not be appropriate in all cases. For instance, where no evidence of strangulation is presented, there is no reason to instruct the jury on the definition of strangulation as provided in Subsection (2)(B). Conversely, in cases where the only evidence is of strangulation, there is no reason to instruct the jury on the definition in Subsection (2)(A) or, for that matter, the definition of \u201cbodily injury.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\">The Committee recognizes that some cases might present evidence of both types of serious bodily injury (strangulation and non-strangulation). In those cases, it may be appropriate to instruct the jury on the entire statutory definition, and the jury would likely have to reach a unanimous decision as to either Subsection (2)(A) or (2)(B). Unlike the three \u201cascending mental states\u201d for second degree murder, which are applied as a hierarchy, see <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">State v. Boglioli<\/span>, 2011 VT 60, \u00b6\u00b6\u00a011\u201312, 190 Vt. 542; <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">State v. Bolio<\/span>, 159 Vt. 250, 253-54 (1992), the two definitions of serious bodily injury are presented as alternatives where one does not necessarily subsume the other.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\">In cases involving evidence of strangulation, the state may proceed either upon a theory that the defendant recklessly caused serious bodily injury to the victim or that the defendant intentionally strangled the victim by intentionally impeding normal breathing or circulation of blood by applying pressure on the throat or neck or by blocking the nose or mouth of another person.\u00a0 As suggested in <u>State v. Carter<\/u>, 2017 VT 32, \u00b6 16, 204 Vt. 383, the state should elect between those two options, and the instructions should not blend or commingle the two separate definitions.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><strong>CR22-355, -356.<\/strong><em><strong>\u00a0\u00a0<strong>First Degree Aggravated Domestic Assault and Transition to Lesser Included Offense of Domestic Assault.<\/strong><\/strong>\u00a0<\/em>Defendants have a right to choose a \u201chard\u201d or a \u201csoft\u201d transition between offenses. <u>State v. Powell<\/u>, 158 Vt. 280, 284 (1992). The hard transition requires a verdict on the highest offense before the jury considers the lesser included offenses. The soft transition allows jurors to consider the lesser offenses if they are unable to agree upon a verdict on the higher offense \u201cafter all reasonable efforts to reach a unanimous verdict.\u201d <u>State v. Duff<\/u>, 150 Vt. 329, 336-37 (1988). Where a defendant \u201cdoes not choose either transition instruction, it is within the discretion of the trial court to decide which instruction to provide.\u201d <u>State v. Rolls<\/u>, 2020 VT 18, \u00b6 9 (trial court did not err in providing both hard and soft transition instructions, rather than one or the other, in the absence of defendant\u2019s request). The committee\u2019s instructions generally contain soft transitions, because most defendants prefer them. However, for defendants who prefer a hard transition, the committee offers the following example:<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify; padding-left: 60px;\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\">You must first consider the charge of first degree aggravated domestic assault.\u00a0 If the State has proven each of the essential elements of that charge, then you must find (Def)_______________ guilty of that charge, and you will be done with your deliberations.\u00a0 If you decide that the State has not proven each and every one of the essential elements of first degree aggravated domestic assault, then you must find (Def)_______________ not guilty of that charge, and then you must consider whether [he] [she] is guilty of the offense of domestic assault.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><strong>22-361, -362, -363.\u00a0 <em>First Degree Aggravated Domestic Assault (Used Deadly Weapon) (Attempted to Use Deadly Weapon) (Threatened to Use Deadly Weapon)<\/em>.\u00a0 <\/strong>The instructions on first degree aggravated domestic assault, under 13 V.S.A. \u00a7 1043, illustrate the difficulty of deciding whether to charge an explicit element of intent.\u00a0 On one hand, CR22-361 (used deadly weapon) includes an explicit element of intent because the charge would be vague without it.\u00a0 The terms \u201cusing\u201d and \u201cdeadly weapon\u201d are both vague unless they are put into context, and thus it is helpful to examine the defendant\u2019s intent.\u00a0 <em>See<\/em>\u00a0<u>State\u00a0v. Stanislaw<\/u>, 153 Vt. 517, 523-24 (1990) (describing factors to consider in determining implied elements of\u00a0<em>mens rea<\/em>).\u00a0 On the other hand, instruction CR22-363, charging that the defendant threatened to use a deadly weapon, does not include an explicit element of intent, because to \u201cthreaten\u201d means\u00a0<em>to communicate an intent<\/em>\u00a0to inflict harm upon the other person.\u00a0 It is not necessary to charge a separate explicit element of intent.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\">The jury must be unanimous as to whether the defendant threatened the complainant with the weapon or used the weapon. <em>See<\/em> <u>State v. Phillips<\/u>, 2024 VT 10, \u00b6 16 (\u201cThe criminal division properly apprised the jury that all twelve members would have to agree that defendant either threatened complainant with the weapon or attempted to use it on her for the State to satisfy its burden. This was adequate to instruct the jury on the requirement of unanimity and does not rise to the level of plain error.\u201d).<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\">Note that while CR22-363 (threatened to use deadly weapon) includes an explicit element that the defendant \u201cwas armed with a deadly weapon,\u201d the model instructions for use and attempted use of a deadly weapon (CR22-361 and -362) do not include that element. This distinction tracks the statutory language and is supported by <u>State v. Phillips<\/u>, 2024 VT 10, \u00b6\u00a011.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\">The definition of \u201cdeadly weapon\u201d is found in 13 V.S.A. \u00a7\u00a01021(a)(3), and the explanation of the required element of intent derives from\u00a0<u>State v. Bourn<\/u>, 2012 VT 71, 192 Vt. 270;\u00a0<em>see also<\/em>\u00a0<u>State v. Kriskov<\/u>, No. 2011-150 (Vt. Dec. 2011) (unpub. mem.). Unlike a charge for reckless endangerment, an unloaded and inoperable gun may be considered a deadly weapon for purposes of an aggravated assault.\u00a0<u>Bourn<\/u>, 2012 VT 71, \u00b6\u00a03 n.2;<em>\u00a0see also<\/em>\u00a0<u>State v. Longley<\/u>, 2007 VT 101, 182 Vt. 452 (holding that an unloaded gun is a \u201cdeadly weapon\u201d for purposes of a first-degree aggravated domestic assault charged under 13 V.S.A. \u00a7\u00a01043(a)(2)). For further discussion of the definition of \u201cdeadly weapon,\u201d <em>see<\/em>\u00a0<u>State v. Kuzawski<\/u>, 2017 VT 118, \u00b6\u00b6 8\u201318, 206 Vt. 351 (box cutter is a deadly weapon).<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><em><strong>CR2<strong>2-371<\/strong><strong>, -372.\u00a0 <\/strong>Second Degree Aggravated Domestic Assault: Violation of Court Order.<\/strong>\u00a0 <\/em>The statute at 13 V.S.A. \u00a7 1044(a)(1) does not specifically require notice of the court order, and the model instruction does not include an element that the defendant received a copy of the order.\u00a0 (Also see CR22-506, aggravated stalking under 13 V.S.A. \u00a7 1063(a)(1)).\u00a0 In contrast, the statute for violation of an abuse prevention order (13 V.S.A. \u00a7 1030) specifically requires notice.\u00a0 Notwithstanding this difference, the committee notes that, in the rare case when the defendant has not received notice of the order, it would be unfair to consider violation of the order as an aggravating factor.\u00a0 In such cases, the element of notice must be proven.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\">There are two versions of this instruction, CR22-371 and CR22-372.\u00a0 The first version includes violation of a criminal court order as the fifth essential element, whereas the second version treats that element as an enhancement element that must be proven in the second phase of a bifurcated proceeding.\u00a0 Bifurcation is appropriate when the prejudice arising from the introduction of an existing criminal court order outweighs any relevance that the order might have to the charged offense.\u00a0 <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">State v. Brillon<\/span>, 2010 VT 25, \u00b6\u00a012, 187 Vt. 444.\u00a0 A judge may select from the two instructions, based on the circumstances of the case and arguments of counsel.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Misdemeanor Domestic Assault CR22-321.\u00a0 Attempted to Cause Bodily Injury, 13 V.S.A. \u00a7 1042 (03\/23\/07) CR22-331.\u00a0 Caused Bodily Injury, 13 V.S.A. \u00a7 1042 (09\/16\/05) CR22-336.\u00a0 Caused Victim to Fear Imminent Serious Bodily Injury, 13 V.S.A. \u00a7 1042 (06\/20\/12) First Degree Aggravated &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/vtjuryinstructions.org\/?page_id=719\">Continue reading <span class=\"meta-nav\">&rarr;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":434,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-719","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/vtjuryinstructions.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/719","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/vtjuryinstructions.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/vtjuryinstructions.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/vtjuryinstructions.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/vtjuryinstructions.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=719"}],"version-history":[{"count":20,"href":"https:\/\/vtjuryinstructions.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/719\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1814,"href":"https:\/\/vtjuryinstructions.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/719\/revisions\/1814"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/vtjuryinstructions.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/434"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/vtjuryinstructions.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=719"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}